Deterrence Gap: Avoiding War in the Taiwan Strait

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily ref lect the off icia l policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the US government. [...] These four variables are the de facto erosion of One China as a viable discursive framework within which to reconcile the competing political interests of China, Taiwan, and the United States; slowing economic growth in China; the severance of China from the global semiconductor supply chain and US silicon onshoring; and a closing window of opportunity for China to launch a successful attack on Ta. [...] This chapter is the longest of the monograph, paying attention to shifts in the Sino-Taiwanese-American relationship, slowing economic growth in China, moves to sever the Chinese economy from the global semiconductor supply chain, and the military balance of power. [...] The People’s Republic of China’s fear of a US intercession on Taiwan’s behalf reached an apogee in the late 1990s due to the combined effect of US signaling in the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, the US intervention in Kosovo, and the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.23 More recently, 100 percent of experts interviewed in an authoritative survey believed that, in the event of an invasion, Be. [...] Instead of operating as a device to ensure the United States’ commitment to Taiwan’s defense, the Taiwanese chip industry became more of an economic doomsday device—an industry that, if attacked and destroyed during war, would wreak havoc upon the Chinese economy (as well as the rest of the world).48 In 2021, the People’s Republic of China imported $421 billion in semiconductors, most of which wer.