Together, these channels represent the majority of the immigration flows to the US.2 One of the advantages of understanding these immigration categories is that the results of this study are to some extent easier to relate to policy than if the model considered the “skilled” and “unskilled” immigration groups typically studied. [...] Since most of the discussion is in terms of the adjusted wage wau, in what follows wau is simply referred to as the wage of unauthorized immigrants, while the term wu is referred to as the “observed wage.” The policy tool E represents the amount of resources per native devoted to enforcement, which indirectly determines the equilibrium unauthorized immigration θu. [...] The per-person amount of the public good is given by G g = , (6) (1 + θF + θs + θu) whereG > 0 is the aggregate and exogenous amount of the public good available to natives and immigrants.9 The social welfare function is assumed to be increasing in (i) the transfer b, (ii) the availability of the common resource g, and (iii) the amount of family-based immigration θ .10F In particular, it is assume. [...] Condition (9) represents the marginal rate of substitution of the common resource g for the transfer b and equates it to the marginal rate of transformation of g for b where the implied “inputs” that define the frontier of possibilities of production in (g, b) are the optimally combined immigration quotas of each type. [...] The parameters are (i) α, which determines the importance of the common resource; (ii) γ, which partially governs the strength of the family-based immigration motive; and (iii) the parameterA from the production function in the enforcement sector (where ξ = A−ρ).
- Pages
- 73
- Published in
- United States of America
