U) Intersections: Technology, National Security, and US-China Strategic Competition, Issue 9

In March 2024, the Financial Times and Nikkei Asia reported that the US is pushing major chipmaking equipment exporters— including Japan, the Netherlands, and South Korea—to further limit their exports of chipmaking materials and components to China.16 In January 2023, the US persuaded Japan and the Netherlands to restrict high- end chipmaking exports (Issue 3) to the PRC following the US’s own un. [...] The launch of the new port security initiative came amid an ongoing investigation by the House Committee on Homeland Security and the Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the CCP on cybersecurity risks, foreign intelligence threats, and supply chain vulnerabilities tied to PRC maritime equipment and technology. [...] The PRC government work report, approved in March following the Two Sessions (discussed above), reiterated the importance of the digital economy to Beijing’s innovation and foreign policy goals.39 The Digital Silk Road includes subsea cable projects, and building and operating fiber optic cables is part of Beijing’s efforts to expand “international communications connectivity” along the Belt and R. [...] 2 Li Qiang, Report on the Work of the Government, Delivered at the Second Session of the 14th National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, Xinhua News, Mar. [...] 52 Rana Foroohar, “Shipbuilding: The New Battleground in the US-China Trade War.” 53 “Joint Statement from the Leaders of the United States and the Republic of Indonesia: Elevating Relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” The White House, Nov.