Indeed, after the initial phase of airstrikes and as the IDF began to better understand The October 7 War: Observations, October 2023 - May 2024 9 the nature of the battlefield in Gaza and how to operate securely and effectively on it, the IDF changed its procedures to reduce the number of munitions being dropped in Gaza in order to reduce risk to civilians. [...] • From the inception of the maneuver operation, the IDF failed to effectively convey the gravity of the enemy threat and the accordant scale of the operation needed to address this threat. [...] Although the IDF has made significant strides in its strategic communications compared to previous conflicts, in spite of clear biases in some global media, Israel’s ability to reach international publics to explain the justness of its cause, the legality of its operations, and the responsibility of its enemy for the suffering of the Gazan population continues to prove insufficient to balance agai. [...] However, in order to enter Gaza City in the opening stages of the ground maneuver, Israel’s 36th Division made a tactical maneuver to surprise Hamas by first bypassing Gaza City and reaching the Gazan shore and then attacking Hamas from the west, approaching Hamas battalions from behind and evading much of their defensive capabilities.12 In other maneuvers, the IDF used speed to surprise and overp. [...] Reasons that the IDF chose to send ground forces into the tunnels included fear that bombing the tunnels would have posed risks to potential hostages being held in the tunnels, the collateral damage associated with such attacks, the IDF gaining confi- dence that they could fight effectively and safely beneath the ground, and concerns that destroying tunnels from the air would have consumed unneces.
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- 85
- Published in
- United States of America
