cover image: Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools

20.500.12592/d89shn

Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools

11 Sep 2020

This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile' or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.
education public policy labor market exchange rate rwanda rural development blindness development policy disability experimental design exchange rates job satisfaction occupational choice political science community health social psychology teachers number of pupils school day labor supply labor demand standard deviation value added jobs labor markets test score contract theory open access teacher quality student assessment student learning teacher performance student engagement experimental study advertising campaign state school intrinsic motivation job performance standard error lesson plan behavioral economics item response theory multiple choice degrees of freedom test statistic ordinary least squares regression lesson planning school year theoretical model teacher assessment development research group teachers management effective schools and teachers educational institutions & facilities nutrition and population social protections and labor new contract female student social study social studies 0 hypothesis robustness check summary statistic treatment group performance contract in school rural labor markets baseline data compensation scheme learning and innovation credit health economics & finance africa east policy option available data extensive consultation learning level collected data student learn outcome test result baseline survey number of teachers school level spot check classroom observation high power geographical feature teacher salary program impact based contracts good performance performance award individual need school visit contract variation promotional material recent work private information potential candidate behavioral response previous work errors and omission in economics school district classroom practice small sample core subject test administration assessment data base assessment relevant contract social return student outcome analytical approach civil service job potential applicant causal chain survey instrument study design causal impact school register compensation policy particular contract physical resources job fair upper primary primary teacher demographic variables english version teacher workforce outcome data skill base salaried employment teaching post primary teaching average monthly salary private return teacher behavior teacher evaluation school survey alternative hypothesis teacher characteristic student characteristic academic interest instructional activity policy relevance application decision unannounced visit teaching job contract structure incidental parameter exclusion of student attendance check annual salary budget neutral teacher incentive career decision range of health outcome terms of skills student answer power gain supply-side response power loss student ability risk neutral modern language teacher monitoring model yield results-based financing for health

Authors

Leaver,Clare,Ozier,Owen,Serneels,Pieter Maria,Zeitlin,Andrew

Disclosure Status
Disclosed
Doc Name
Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools
Document Date
2020-09-11
Originating Unit
DECRG: Human Development (DECHD)
Published in
United States of America
Series Name
Policy Research working paper;no. WPS 9395
Total Volume(s)
1
Unit Owning
Off of Sr VP Dev Econ/Chief Econ (DECVP)
Version Type
Final
Volume No
1

Files

Recruitment-Effort-and-Retention-Effects-of-Performance-Contracts-for-Civil-Servants-Experimental-Evidence-from-Rwandan-Primary-Schools.txt

Recruitment-Effort-and-Retention-Effects-of-Performance-Contracts-for-Civil-Servants-Experimental-Evidence-from-Rwandan-Primary-Schools.pdf

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