cover image: Deterring at a distance: The strategic logic of AUKUS

20.500.12592/jdfn941

Deterring at a distance: The strategic logic of AUKUS

24 Jun 2024

Executive summary As China’s massive military build-up drives rising regional security anxieties, Australia is contributing to a more favourable balance of power through AUKUS. This technology-sharing agreement with the United Kingdom and the United States will see eight nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) in Australian service by the 2050s. SSNs are overwhelmingly in Australia’s interest because they strengthen the country’s ability to deter war by threatening painful consequences for aggression against Australia, its partners, and its interests. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review explicitly tasks the Australian Defence Force with a deterrence role against a significant military power — a relatively new mission. SSNs are optimal deterrence machines, able to accomplish the essential tasks laid out in the Review . The purpose of AUKUS Australia’s decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines through the AUKUS partnership is one of the most consequential industrial endeavours the country has ever undertaken. Creating 20,000 jobs, AUKUS will see $30 billion invested in Australia’s industrial base and $18 billion in infrastructure upgrades, serving to upskill the country’s workforce and boost its shipbuilding industry for decades. While these benefits stoke much of the excitement around AUKUS, job creation and industry policy are not the main reasons Canberra is acquiring a cutting-edge defence capability costing up to 0.15 per cent of the country’s annual GDP over 30 years. Jobs and industry growth will not in themselves determine the success or failure of AUKUS. The main reason to acquire and build SSNs in Australia is their potent strategic effect. Their purpose is to give the Australian Defence Force (ADF) a regionally superior capability that will help it to deter war and, if it must fight a war, to win. Whether the benefits of the AUKUS plan outweigh the costs depends chiefly on whether it is the right response to the strategic risks facing Australia, what the SSNs can do militarily, and whether they will make Australia safer. On these grounds, AUKUS is the best deal on offer. AUKUS is already on trial, and the burden of evidence is higher than for any other Australian defence project. By acquiring SSNs, Australia will be able to enter the deterrence game in earnest because it can credibly threaten painful consequences for attempts to attack the country. Governments cannot always say this openly. Departmental releases in dry bureaucratese often gloss over the purpose and operational uses of a military capability, letting euphemisms such as “unprecedented strategic challenges” substitute for a clear explanation. Only a full-throated defence can dispel the claims of AUKUS critics that the project lacks a well-defined strategic logic.

Authors

Luke Gosling

Published in
Australia

Table of Contents