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What these various attempts have in common is the recognition that the vital importance of cyberspace to the national economy and daily life, combined with the weaknesses of cyberspace, poses many dangers to the public sector, the private sector, and the populace as a whole. [...] At the same time, the scope of this responsibility, the type of regulation that is appropriate, and the regulatory tools chosen should be determined based on the anticipated level of risk to the public interest from a successful cyberattack against each actor or sector. [...] Unsurprisingly, there is a correlation between the anticipated risk level to these defined national interests and the degree of state intervention in the free market, as manifested in the regulatory tool used: the greater the risk, the more the state tends to apply more “interventionist” regulatory tools. [...] We therefore recommend the following: (1) Add to the law proposed in the Cyber Law Memorandum an objects clause that defines the boundaries of possible interpretation of the powers granted by the law to the National Cyber Directorate. [...] (2) Change the current model of “regulating the different regulators,” and position the National Cyber Directorate as the sole regulator in charge of setting the rules and required standards for cyber protection.