An accurate understanding of the nature of the expected war and the appropriate organization of the IDF in preparation for it led to the defeat of a coalition of Arab countries. [...] Every military planner understands that in the face of the power of the enemy's anti-tank missiles in the north, a power that has only increased and been perfected during the months of the current war, and in the face of the ability the enemy has developed to penetrate our air defense systems, the State of Israel currently does not have a decisive short war option. [...] Instead, we should be content with a moderate increase in the size of the forces and focus on the two crucial variables described above: the capabilities to locate and destroy underground infrastructure, and to suppress the enemy's launch capabilities in the north against both our forces and the home front. [...] The next campaign in the Thirty Years’ War with Iran and its proxies should begin with the rapid and effective removal of the Hezbollah threat in the north through the occupation of southern Lebanon at the same time as the destruction of most of the enemy's missile capabilities. [...] The removal of the threat from the north will make it possible to divert most of our forces to the recapture of the Gaza Strip, if necessary, the completion of its purification, and the implementation of a plan to stabilize it without Hamas.
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- Pages
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- Israel
