202 - ERF W 4 P s - Sudan’s Future between Catastrophic Conflict

The ramifications of the security sector reform provisions, especially with regard to the pace of the integration of the RSF into SAF and issues associated with the structure and accountability in the new chain of command, led to a major rift between the 2 The Sudanese armed forces (SAF) is led by Gen Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, while the paramilitaries of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is led by Gen. [...] It is also widely documented in the Sudanese economic and political literature that both sides have used their control of the state to shield their economic assets and commercial activities from the oversight and control of the Ministry of Finance during the Ingaz regime, where these activities were the centerpiece of the regime’s survival strategy, as part of the rent distribution in the “politic. [...] In view of the sheer scale of deaths and human sufferings associated with the Darfur conflict, and the concern that it might risk derailing the then ongoing peace negotiations of the CPA, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in 2006 under the auspices of Nigeria and the African Union, and support by the UN, USA and other regional and international actors. [...] The Juba Peace Accord led to the dissolution of the technocratic government and the formation of a largely political quota government, dominated by the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) and the armed movements that signed the Accord.26 Unfortunately, like its predecessors, the Juba PSA was not a broad-based peace process that would also empower the civil society from the conflict-affected regions. [...] Even in the more open and transparent political environment in the aftermath of the December Revolution, the failure of the FFC to ensure a broad-based PSA, the Juba Accord that was largely confined to the military protagonists enabled a side counterrevolutionary deal between the leaderships of SAF- RSF on one hand and some of the rebel groups that signed the agreement.