The EU-Japan partnership in the Indo-Pacific: opportunities and challenges

This paper analyses the common and divergent interests of Japan and the EU in the Indo-Pacific and identifies the most promising areas for cooperation. In recent years Europeans have reassessed the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific. Several member states (France, Germany and the Netherlands) have already published their own approaches and an Indo-Pacific outlook or strategy for the EU is now being discussed in Brussels. This development confirms the convergence of views and interests with Japan, which has been rolling out its vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) since 2016. As a result, promoting bilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific has become one of the top priorities for the EU-Japan partnership, as reflected by the Third Meeting of the Joint Committee on the implementation of the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) held on 26 February. Indeed, Japan and the EU, two like-minded partners, are both committed to the multilateral rules-based order that is being challenged in the Indo-Pacific. They both recognise that their security and prosperity are dependent on the open and secure maritime routes running through the region and on the respect for the rule of law by all players. They thus share a fundamental interest in addressing the sources of instability in the Indo-Pacific by ensuring a balance of power, the maintenance of a law-based order and good governance. For that, they can build on their respective experiences in supporting connectivity and upholding maritime security in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans to further their cooperation. While there are many common interests involved in acting in the region, there are also challenges. In particular, the EU and Japan are not located in the same part of the world and the differences in their perceptions of, and relations with, China and the US can cause unease. In particular, the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’ has caused concern in Japan, which sees it as a potential impediment to shaping a coalition of like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan is also unsure of the EU’s definite stance on China, or on the sustainability of its future commitment to the Indo-Pacific. Expectation gaps should thus be avoided at all cost by ensuring frequent consultations between the partners and through a thorough exchange of information to reach a common understanding of the situation in the Indo-Pacific. This paper suggests a number of areas –maritime security, connectivity, the rule of law and governance of the commons– to harvest the low-hanging fruits of cooperation and ensure the credibility and sustainability of a shared commitment to the Indo-Pacific. Japan and Europe: converging interests in the Indo-Pacific Both Japan and the EU now recognise the central importance of the Indo-Pacific for their economic and security interests. Back in 2016, Prime Minister Abe articulated his Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, which takes stock of the economic and strategic integration of the vast area running from the eastern coast of Africa to the South Pacific. Importantly, FOIP is a flexible and evolutionary geopolitical narrative that offers an alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), seen by Tokyo as a ploy for Beijing to expand its influence, revise the post-1945 world order and impose its own standards. Therefore, Japan’s vision for the region has three pillars: upholding the rule of law, freedom of navigation and free trade; the promotion of connectivity through infrastructure to achieve prosperity; and the contribution to peace and security through capacity-building, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and anti-piracy operations. The EU is still not officially using the term ‘Indo-Pacific’, but it nonetheless recognises that this vast region is now the world’s epicentre in terms of geoeconomics and geopolitics, in which any disruption directly impacts its key interests. In particular, Europe, as a trade powerhouse, has obvious interests in keeping the vital maritime routes to Asia open, secure and stable. The Indo-Pacific is also the central stage of the Sino-US geostrategic competition that will shape the future world order. In this context, the EU wants to ensure that the power shift will not lead to a new order that will be detrimental to its interests. In addition, a multipolar region should be fostered to mitigate the negative effects of great-power rivalry. Finally, as a normative power, the EU cares about maintaining a multilateral, rules-based order that is one of the key conditions of its prosperity. Therefore, the EU has taken a series of step to demonstrate a more consistent posture in Asia, beginning with the publication of its EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy and its commitment to enhance its security cooperation in and with Asia (2018). The March 2019 Strategic Outlook qualifying China as a partner, competitor and systemic rival pointed to a more strategic posture vis à vis Beijing. Brussels has also made efforts to deepen its relations with its local partners: Japan, but also India, South-East Asian countries, ASEAN and others. France, Germany and the Netherlands have already adopted their own Indo-Pacific strategies and encourage the EU to design its own Indo-Pacific outlook. Such a document would allow Brussels to articulate a clear strategic vision that encompasses its various initiatives in the region and clearly positions the EU as a relevant actor in the context of Sino-US rivalry.