Tackling the Niger–Libya migration route

Since the Libyan revolution in 2011, the number of migrants passing through the country en route to Europe has grown significantly. Many of these migrants come from other parts of Africa, through the well-established transit hub of Agadez in neighbouring Niger. Just as insecurity in Libya has had a profound impact on the migration boom in the city of Agadez, the revenues generated by migrant smuggling in Niger have, in turn, influenced conflict dynamics along the Libya–Niger border and in southern Libya. In response to the increase in maritime arrivals from Libya, European policymakers saw Agadez as a ‘perfect target’ for policies that aimed to reduce migration to Europe by encouraging and implementing controls in transit states. A pivotal moment came in May 2015, when the government of Niger, under pressure from various international partners, criminalized the migration economy in Agadez. While it was hoped that criminalization would disrupt these migration flows, it in fact pushed migrant smuggling networks underground, displaced traditional itineraries, placed migrants at greater risk and accelerated a transition to other economic activities, including burgeoning gold mining and illegal activities in the region. Criminalization also led to the emergence of new transnational conflict dynamics in northern Niger, with actors from various Tebu, Tuareg and Arab communities operating across the Niger–Libya border and competing for control over different aspects of the gold economy, as well as other licit and illicit activities. A July 2023 coup d’état in Niger brought to power a military-led government that sought to reset relationships with many traditional security and development partners. In November 2023, the Nigerien junta announced the repeal of the anti-migrant smuggling law, which is likely to have a profound impact on the political economy of Agadez as migrant smuggling activity resumes within a geopolitical context that is markedly different from 2015. Although there is no evidence that the coup leaders were motivated by opposition to the country’s partnership with European states on migration control, the current government has demonstrated a clear hostility to this type of arrangement, instead seeking to deepen partnerships with like-minded neighbours in Burkina Faso and Mali, and with Russia. To address issues of migrant smuggling and conflict, it is imperative that policymakers understand the ways in which various actors may insert themselves into a resurgent migration economy in northern Niger. A comprehensive systems analysis could achieve this goal. Conflict dynamics in the region have changed considerably since the criminalization of migration activities in 2015, and may impact security dynamics in Niger, southern Libya and, potentially, other states in the Sahel.