China’s Nuclear Ambiguity and its Implications for India

China’s nuclear strategy has largely remained unchanged since it exploded its first nuclear device in 1964: [1] it is based on achieving deterrence through assured retaliation. A crucial requirement for assured retaliation is the survivability of one’s arsenal following the first strike by an adversary, whether conventional or nuclear. [2] However, its current security dynamics with the United States (US) are compelling China to rethink its operational capabilities to achieve effective deterrence. Beijing’s challenges are compounded by the US’ Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) system and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capabilities. [a] , [3] China expert Lora Salmaan argues that “Chinese analysts view CPGS as part of a larger US effort to achieve ‘absolute security’, with BMD as the shield and CPGS as the sword – such that Washington is able to act pre-emptively.” [4] This combination of the CPGS and BMD is arguably one of the key drivers for China’s aggressive attempts to modernise its nuclear arsenal and increase its nuclear ambiguity through conventional-nuclear entanglement.