North Korea’s burgeoning nuclear program is already placing greater demands on US extended deterrence and also raising questions in Seoul and Tokyo about the robustness of 1 This paper represents the author’s personal views and does not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or any part of the US government. [...] The Kim regime’s political legitimacy has long been pegged to the stated goal of unification, which is enshrined in the country’s constitution and the charter of the Workers’ Party of Korea.9 Kim Jong Un made clear that nuclear weapons serve those revisionist aims when he stated that “Nuclear weapons are the sword that advances the cause of Korean reunification.”10 Indeed, the North has already de. [...] 16 | SHANE SMITH IMPLICATIONS FOR US EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND ASSURANCE IN EAST ASIA The reason for this divide between public opinion and the positions of political leaders could be due in part to a stronger appreciation within the political and strategic communities for the US alliance—flaws and all—and the damage that nuclear appeals would likely have on the relationship. [...] Indeed, it is also worth keeping in mind that South Korea previously explored and invested in elements of a secret nuclear weapons program in the 1970s when it was concerned about US security commitments.36 The United States has committed to strengthening extended deterrence and to assuring South Korea of US resolve in the face of a nuclear-armed North Korea. [...] North Korea is sometimes considered the “cat’s paw” in a Chinese strategy to push the United States out of the region, antagonize and distract Japan, and pave the way for China’s regional expansion.44 Regardless of the actual link between China and North Korea, the rising costs of US regional deterrence against multiple nuclear threats heighten Japan’s long-term anxiety over US security commitment.
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