Australia and the emerging nuclear order in Northeast Asia 3 The changing regional threat environment The China threat and Japan US-led response can be mounted.5 This assessment was reflected in the 2023 final report of the Con- gressional Commission on the Strategic Posture The first vector of the regional Chinese threat is con- of the United States (US Strategic Posture Review), ventional. [...] South Korea remains heavily invested in pyropro- Further, in July 2022, the South Korean Ministry of cessing, with Korea’s Nuclear Energy Promotion National Defence announced the establishment of Commission in 2021 committing to continued a new “strategic command” under the direction of R&D and consideration of the commercialisation the Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate South Korea’s of pyroproc. [...] This has the potential to offset the United States’ deteriorating balance In this second nuclear order, Washington, Tokyo, of conventional power as China in particular will and Seoul, conscious of the deteriorating balance of be disincentivised from pressing a conventional regional power and the attendant risks of Chinese advantage too hard for fear that the United States, and North Korean attempt. [...] At the same time, Australia and the emerging nuclear order in Northeast Asia 15 Prospects for change in the regional nuclear order Each nuclear order discussed above represents a US nuclear superiority coherent response by Japan, South Korea, and the United States to the interconnected challenges of growing threats from China and North Korea; ques- The terms ‘nuclear superiority’ and ‘nuclear infe. [...] The second is nuclear sharing, Australia from projecting power northward, com- in which the US redeploys TNWs to Japanese and/ promising the Australian ability to contribute to or South Korean territory to bolster deterrence regional deterrence and a favourable balance of against Chinese and North Korean attempts to regional power, and deny adversaries the space to alter the status quo, strengthen.
- Pages
- 40
- Published in
- Australia
Table of Contents
- Australia and the emerging nuclear order in Northeast Asia 1
- Table of contents 3
- Executive summary 2 3
- Introduction 3 3
- The changing regional threat environment 3
- The China threat and Japan 3
- The North Korea threat and South Korea 3
- Regional nuclear latency 3
- Japan 3
- South Korea 3
- Candidate nuclear orders 3
- Nuclear horse-trading 3
- Nuclear sharing 3
- Nuclear proliferation 3
- Prospects for change in the regional nuclear order 3
- US nuclear superiority 3
- The regional balance of conventional power 3
- Barriers to nuclearisation 3
- Pushback from Beijing 3
- Domestic politics 3
- US non-proliferation policy 3
- Implications for Australia 3
- What if nuclear sharing 3
- What if nuclear proliferation 3
- Conclusions 27 3
- Endnotes 28 3
- About the author 37 3
- Executive summary 4
- Introduction 5
- The China threat and Japan 6
- The changing regional threat environment 6
- The North Korea threat and South Korea 9
- Regional nuclear latency 11
- Japan 12
- South Korea 12
- Nuclear horse-trading 14
- Candidate nuclear orders 14
- Nuclear sharing 16
- Nuclear proliferation 17
- US nuclear superiority 18
- Prospects for change in the regional nuclear order 18
- The likely erosion of US nuclear superiority in Northeast Asia with respect to China if not both China and North Korea will likely constrain the US in its regional military engagements. 18
- The regional balance of conventional power 19
- Barriers to nuclearisation 21
- What if nuclear sharing 23
- Implications for Australia 23
- In managing the growing threat profiles of China and North Korea nuclear sharing is a high risk high reward strategy. 23
- What if nuclear proliferation 26
- Conclusions 29
- Australia must consider seriously the possibility that nuclear sharing or nuclear proliferation emerges in the region by 2040. 29
- Endnotes 30
- About the author 39
- Dr Christopher J. Watterson 39
