acquiring more, and appear to face a major morale In the follow up media interviews we made it clear problem in the ADF not unrelated to the one facing the that the AUSMIN statement outlines measures nation as a whole? that point in the right direction, towards greater The first paper in our Defence of Australia blueprint cooperation. [...] This must be part of have yet to re-open our Embassy in Kyiv in the a larger conversation that the Prime Minister years since the initial evacuation during the Russian needs to lead about service to the nation and invasion, indicates a lack of interest at the highest community. [...] identified the F-35A as the preferred option to replace Since submarines were reintroduced to the Navy in the Hornet fleet in 2002; we are still waiting for the the late 1960s, it has consisted of six submarines, last of the 72 aircraft to be delivered. [...] But we need to accept that as a constellation of megaprojects of the Moreover, the scale of investment required to kind that historically are most likely to underachieve acquire and operate a safe and credible SSN against the iron triangle of cost, capability, and capability risks distorting the ADF under the level of schedule, it is almost inevitable key elements of the funding currently planned. [...] We assess that the B-21 is the best option to increase We reiterate our recommendation from the first Australia’s strike capability in the maritime and land paper in this series that the government should seek domains in the near term.
- Pages
- 36
- Published in
- Australia
Table of Contents
- Overview 3
- The Defence of Australia A blueprint for the next government. 3
- Foreword 4
- Overview i 7
- Foreword ii 7
- Executive summary 1 7
- Recommendations 2 7
- 2.1 How to build an Australian Defence Force that meets Australias strategic requirements 3 7
- 2.2 Ukraine and other contemporary conflicts 4 7
- 2.3 Core challenges for the ADF 6 7
- 2.4 Addressing our force structure shortfalls 12 7
- 2.5 Addressing the ADFs people problem 20 7
- 2.6 Supporting our forces Logistics and sustainment 23 7
- Appendix How long would we last 24 7
- Table of contents 7
- Executive summary 8
- RECOMMENDATION 7 9
- RECOMMENDATION 8 9
- RECOMMENDATION 9 9
- RECOMMENDATION 10 9
- RECOMMENDATION 11 9
- RECOMMENDATION 12 9
- Recommendations 9
- 2.1 How to build an Australian Defence Force that 10
- National lessons 11
- 2.2 Ukraine and other contemporary conflicts 11
- Learning the lessons 12
- 2.3 Core challenges for the ADF 13
- The people problem 14
- The complexity problem 16
- The speed to capability problem 16
- The money problem 17
- The mass problem 17
- Beyond theology 17
- Nuclear-powered submarines SSNs 19
- 2.4 Addressing our force structure shortfalls 19
- Complement the exquisite with mass 20
- Adopt autonomous systems more rapidlyeven if they are not perfect 21
- Restoring a strike advantage the B-21 bomber 22
- A good offence needs a strong defence 23
- Filling the gaps created by insufficient funding 24
- A national conversation around service 27
- 2.5 Addressing the ADFs people problem 27
- Expand opportunities for part-time contributionsestablish a technology reserve 28
- Give the Army reserve a unique and motivating role 28
- Simpler systems allow faster expansion 29
- Treat the crisis like a crisis 29
- 2.6 Supporting our forces Logistics and sustainment 30
- How Long Would We Last 31
- About the Institute of Public Affairs 34
- About Strategic Analysis Australia 34
- About the authors 35
