In the context of Measures (CBMs) biosecurity, the objective of CBMs is to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and to improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities. [...] The impact of the 2019 Coronavirus pandemic on the discourse and prioritisation of biosecurity is evident in several ways as it highlighted: the critical role of laboratory capacity in public health surveillance and research; the threats posed by dual-use research of concern (DURC) and gain-of-function (GoF) studies; the potential for laboratories to be sources of biological agents; and concerns a. [...] In Thailand, the National Center for Generic Engineering and Biotechnology (BIOTEC) plays a crucial role in supporting and transferring technology for the development of industry, agriculture, natural resources and the environment, thereby enhancing the social and economic well-being of the Thai people.54 The Thai government managed to secure support from the population through tax incentives, gra. [...] Relevant organisations for implementation of the BWC include the Biosafety Branch of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Director-General of Customs. [...] 30 ASEAN Member States, “ASEAN Member States’ Perspective on International Cooperation and Assistance Under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC),” Second Session of Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Sto.
Authors
Mely Caballero Anthony;Julius Trajano;Jose Ma Luis Montesclaros;Jeselyn
Related Organizations
- Pages
- 30
- Published in
- Singapore
Table of Contents
- Glossary of Terms 4
- 1. Introduction 8
- 2. Biosecurity: An Evolving Field with Diverse and Emerging Priorities 9
- (i) Brief Overview of Biosecurity Definitions Adopted in this Report 10
- (ii) Assessing Biosecurity Risk Perceptions in Southeast Asian Countries 12
- 3. Understanding Risks from National Perspectives 13
- (i) Emerging and Re-emerging Diseases 13
- (ii) Deliberate Misuse and Bioterrorism 14
- (iii) Advances in Biotechnology and Dual-Use Research of Concern 15
- (iv) Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity 16
- 4. National Frameworks, Approaches and Practices 18
- (i) Existing Policy Frameworks 18
- (ii) A One Health Systems Approach in Tracking Diseases 20
- (iii) Raising Biosecurity Awareness and Expertise among Policymakers and Across Sectors 20
- (iv) Security-Health Sectors Cooperation and Joint Training to Boost Enforcement 21
- (v) Developing National Control Lists and Inventories of Pathogens, Toxins and Security Sensitive Biological Agents 22
- 5. Recommendations for Enhanced Regional Cooperation 22
- (i) Promote Harmonisation of Biosecurity Protocols and Capacity Building through ASEAN Regional Networks 22
- (ii) Conduct Workshops on Biosecurity 23
- (iii) Develop Regional Research Networks for Information Exchange 23
- (iv) Encourage Sharing of Best Practices on Security-Health Sector Cooperation 24
- (v) Explore One Health Integration of Primary and Secondary Prevention Approaches to Biosecurity Threats 25
- (vi) Encourage the Development of Guidelines on Responsible DURC and Managed Cyberbiosecurity 26
- (vii) Establish Regional Supply Chain Security Framework for Sensitive Pathogens, Toxins and Biological Agents 26
- (viii) Promote and Institutionalise a Security Culture to Prevent Biosecurity Threats 27
- END NOTES 28
