Baltic Security and Defence Review 2014 (2)

The success of the air campaign in the Gulf War contributed to a surge in the use of the COG concept in western military theory and military planning. [...] doctrine in the 1980s and later in NATO doctrine in the 1990s, the responsibility of military strategy and the military campaign has been moved from the strategic level to the new operational level, leaving the military strategic level as the coordinator and translator between the operational level and the political-strategic level. [...] The Gulf War in 1990-1991 was the first test of this new doctrinal concept of an operational level; however, in this case the military- strategic level merged with the operational level, as the military strategic commander (CINC CENTCOM, General Schwarzkopf) became the Joint Force Commander and the one responsible for the military strategy and the military campaign. [...] The Blue grand strategy is decided by the Blue Will CoG; it uses the Blue ability COG to carry out the main effort of the grand strategy and which leads to the achievement of the Blue National Strategic Objectives (NSOs) comprising the Blue Political End State. [...] The Will and Ability COG concept aids strategy practitioners in developing a strategy that considers both the will and the ability of the strategic actors involved in the conflict (regular or irregular), it provides a logical connection between the levels of war, and it provides clear and simple definitions, which aid in identifying the COGs in the first place.