learning to find effective ways to mitigate harm to civilians and to respond to that harm, US efforts to In the introduction to the CHMR-AP, Secretary Austin mitigate civilian harm were incomplete or ineffective states the plan is “scalable and relevant to both overall. [...] Specifically, we discuss conduct its mission? In other words, How can the characteristics of the adversary, of friendly forces, military be effective when fighting with one hand tied of allies and partners, of the information domain, behind its back? The heart of this concern is the view and of the civilian environment that are relevant to that civilian harm mitigation is synonymous with implement. [...] We also outlined the an accurate understanding of the CHMR approach, key decisive elements of CHMR for US strategy including understanding how and when civilian harm and the kinds of dilemmas—both operational occurs, we can then examine the CHMR approach in and information-operations–related—that CHMR LSCOs and determine what is needed. [...] In conjunction with the US develop the ability to practice CHMR in the the sponsor, we identified four key areas essential course of a LSCO? to effective CHMR: constructing the civilian | 2 Preparing for Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response in Large-Scale Combat Operations environment, mitigating civilian harm, assessing cheese). [...] The effectiveness of this adversary approach is intended to “regain and maintain information and due to several factors, including the following: decision advantage.”28 z The increasing transparency of war, with Recognizing that the use of AI and autonomy the 24-hour news cycle and social media introduces new sources of risk to both friendly bringing tactical events into living rooms forces and ci.
Authors
- Pages
- 140
- Published in
- United States of America
Table of Contents
- Introduction 13
- Is CHMR possible during a LSCO? 13
- Methodology 14
- Organization of this report 15
- Defining CHMR 18
- A comprehensive approach to CHMR 20
- CHMR can promote effectiveness 21
- CHMR can mitigate other costs of civilian harm 23
- Projected Attributes of Future LSCOs 26
- Adversarial aspects of the operating environment 26
- Operational approach 26
- Civilian environment 27
- Ally and partner relationships 28
- Information environment 28
- CHMR: A Strategic Offset 30
- Historical offset strategies 31
- First Offset: nuclear deterrence to conventional capabilities 32
- Second Offset: reconnaissance and precision strike 33
- Third Offset: operationalizing AI and autonomy 33
- CHMR as a fourth offset 34
- Testing CHMR as the fourth offset 36
- Reinforcing US grand strategy 37
- Having a management approach in place for rapid institutional change 39
- Following the paradigm of military revolution 40
- Implications for learning 41
- Improving institutional learning 41
- Improving operational learning 43
- Pursuing CHMR as the fourth offset 43
- Constructing the Civilian Environment 44
- Historical approaches to the civilian environment 45
- Lessons from history 46
- Purposes of the civilian environment 47
- Data required for the civilian environment 48
- How the civilian environment can be operationalized for CHMR 50
- Role of civilian environment teams 52
- Key considerations of the civilian environment 53
- Mitigation of Civilian Harm 55
- Breakdowns in communication and C2 57
- LSCO risk factors for breakdowns in communication and C2 59
- Poor understanding of the civilian environment 60
- LSCO risk factors for poor understanding of the civilian environment 61
- Cognitive bias and false assumptions 62
- Assuming hostile intent 62
- Assuming no civilians are present 62
- Using leading or imprecise language 63
- Building biases into military processes and procedures 64
- Assuming that nothing more can be done to mitigate civilian harm 65
- Assuming that when civilian harm happens, DOD knows about it 65
- LSCO risk factors for cognitive bias and false assumptions 66
- Not exploring mitigation measures 66
- Tactics: creative but ad hoc and inconsistent 67
- Tools and capabilities: a lack of options 67
- Learning: inconsistent operationally, weak institutionally 68
- LSCO risk factors for not exploring mitigation measures 69
- CHMR Assessments During a LSCO 71
- Utility of incident-specific versus macro-level assessments 72
- Past practices for assessing civilian harm 74
- Sources and methods for civilian harm assessments 75
- Conclusion 78
- Response During a LSCO 79
- History and key lessons 79
- Options for response 82
- Public statements and acknowledgments 82
- Private acknowledgments 82
- Locally held commemorative events or symbols 83
- Condolence payments 83
- Medical care 83
- Facilitating access to basic needs 83
- Ordnance mapping and removal 84
- State- or community-level reconstruction and development 84
- Considerations in planning for LSCO response options 84
- Operating in the territory of an ally or partner 85
- Challenges in assessing a possible high number of individual incidents 85
- Mis- and disinformation in the battlespace 86
- Civilian harm strategic communications playbook 86
- Civilians dispersed across the theater 88
- Deep operations into a hostile country 88
- Integrating response planning throughout the CHMR life cycle 88
- Mission and mandate 88
- Planning 89
- Operational execution 89
- Assessment 90
- Response 90
- Learning and adapting 90
- Additional Topics for CHMR in LSCO 91
- Lessons for CHACs and operational learning for CHMR 91
- Effective mitigation of civilian harm: ISAF operations in Afghanistan 91
- Approach not seen in more recent operations 93
- Organizing an operational headquarters for CHMR 93
- Civilian harm tracking 93
- Longitudinal analysis of civilian harm 94
- Military implementation of mitigation steps 95
- CHMR metrics and operational analysis considerations 98
- Considering nonlethal and nonkinetic approaches in CHMR 99
- Nonlethal approaches and CHMR 99
- Nonkinetic approaches and CHMR 100
- Recommendations 105
- LSCO progress report within the CHMR Steering Committee 105
- Construction of the civilian environment 105
- Mitigation of civilian harm 108
- Prepare for degraded communications 108
- Address biases and false assumptions 109
- Develop CHMR tactics for LSCOs 109
- Develop CHMR tools and capabilities for LSCOs 109
- Assessments 110
- Data sources available to CHACs 110
- Analytic methods used by CHACs 111
- Additional skills and capabilities for CHMR assessments 111
- Response 112
- Improve strategic communications 112
- Focus on enabling humanitarian assistance to civilians suffering on both sides 112
- Modernize the ex gratia payment system 112
- Establish an interagency working group on response to civilian harm to prepare for future response to civilian harm 113
- Develop discussions with alliances, allies, and partners to begin to understand what might be wanted or needed during LSCOs 113
- Operational learning: CHACs, operational headquarters, and metrics for CHMR 114
- Nonlethal and nonkinetic capabilities and CHMR 114
- CHMR analytic agenda for LSCOs 115
- Appendix: Authorities for Response 117
- DOD authorities for response 117
- Condolence payments 121
- Medical care 122
- Medical care or repairs to damaged structures and infrastructure 124
- Ordnance removal 126
- Broad authorities of relevance 127
- Key Takeaways: DOD Authorities to Respond to Civilian Harm 129
- Abbreviations 130
- References 132
