Ukraine’s operations in the Kursk region demonstrate that the ability of bottom-level commanders to make decisions by themselves and to adopt tactical and strategic plans according to the actual combat and humanitarian situation on the ground (at the beginning, Ukraine expected harder resistance and more modest gains from the operation) are essential in the battlefield. [...] 53 September 26, 2024 during the incursion by the Ukrainian armed forces can be compared with the mostly efficient behavior of local political leaders and self-organization of local communities in Ukraine during the first weeks of Russia’s invasion in 2022. [...] Superiority in organization, training/education, command, communications, intelligence and logistics is more important than superiority in quantity of armed forces and arms During the incursion into the Kursk region, Ukraine has demonstrated that having better organized and trained forces with advanced command, communications and intelligence systems and better logistics allows for the conduct of. [...] This can be more sustainable than bigger and centralized facilities One of the underestimated lessons of the Ukrainian operation in the Kursk region is its influence on the Kursk nuclear power plant. [...] Pavel Luzin is a Senior Fellow at Jamestown Foundation.) Editor’s Note: The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policy or the position of the Prospect Foundation.
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Table of Contents
- Kurskaya oblsat began on August 6 2024 and are still ongoing. Despite the fact that they are taking place in a theater deep inside the continent and on limited 1
- 1. Asymmetric warfare remains effective 2
- Russia still maintains superiority in the amount of artillery air-defense and 2
- There are two important points in this example of asymmetric warfare. First 2
- Ukraine exploited a widespread politico-psychological presumption that a direct attack of an adversarys regular army on Russian soil would be impossible because of Russias status as a nuclear power. 2
- Second Ukraine exploited deficiencies in coordination and communication 2
- 2. Not only capable bottom-level commanders but also capable local 2
- This point is related to the previous one. Ukraines operations in the Kursk 2
- Moreover the capacity and moral state of local civil authorities and local 2
- The behavior of local authorities and communities in the Kursk region 2
- 3. Superiority in organization trainingeducation command 3
- During the incursion into the Kursk region Ukraine has demonstrated that 3
- 4. A quantitatively superior adversary is not as nimble 3
- Almost two months into Ukraines operations in the Kursk region it has 3
- 5. Concentration of firepower and maneuvers can be more important than 3
- This looks like a paradoxical conclusion but the armed forces of Ukraine 3
- Moreover the dispersed and mobile Ukrainian forces have not allowed 3
- Russia to use its artillery and combat aviation in the usual manner against bigger 3
- 6. Spread critical infrastructure like electric power generation and 4
- One of the underestimated lessons of the Ukrainian operation in the Kursk 4
- The same rationale is true for electric substations part of electric power 4
- The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do 4
