The geopolitical contestation over disruptive technolo- created favourable conditions for a further increase in gies between the United States (US) and the People’s the global market share of Chinese technology compa- Republic of China (PRC) leaves a deep imprint on Eu- nies.3 This undermines the competitiveness of Europe- rope.1 Policymakers in the European Union (EU) and the an fi rms. [...] Many fear that the possibility of the PRC leverag- that it is virtually impossible to reduce strategic depen- ing its technological dependencies against Europe could dencies to a degree that provides the economic securi- constrain the strategic choices of the EU and the UK. [...] 22 Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of the People’s Republic of China, “Full Text of the Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China”, Beijing, Chinese Government, 2022, accessed 29 October 2023, at zxxx_662805/202210/t20221025_10791908.html 23 Government of the PRC, “中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要” [Outline of the People’s Republic of China. [...] It In each technological ecosystem, European policymak- has only one goal in mind: to prevent the transfer of ers need to identify the level of ambition given the technology to China that could be used to threaten feasibility of the actions required to achieve a stated Europe. [...] The colour coding of the icons indicates in European technological indispensability the likelihood of Europe developing or maintaining a technological edge over China within a timeframe of 10 European technological strength is the result of more years.
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- Pages
- 212
- Published in
- Germany
- Title in English
- REVERSE DEPENDENCY: - MAKING EUROPE'S DIGITAL TECHNOLOGICAL STRENGTHS INDISPENSABLE TO C HINA [from PDF fonts]
Table of Contents
- Table of Contents 5
- About the Digital Power China Research Consortium 6
- Acknowledgments 6
- Executive Summary DPC 2024 8
- KEY 9
- Reverse Dependencies on China How Europe Can Remain Technologically Indispensable and Preserve its Strategic Autonomy 14
- ABSTRACT 14
- KEY 22
- ABSTRACT 30
- Is the EUs Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment a Strategic Chokepoint 30
- Fabs depend on all generations of lithography tools 33
- Process nodes can be built in diff erent ways 33
- Mixing lithography tools from diff erent suppliers sacrifi ces accuracy 34
- Many diff erent types of auxiliary tools are necessary for the lithography process 34
- Ease of circumventionreplication 41
- Spillover damage if used as a chokepoint 41
- Energy Performance of Future Wireless Networks Potential for New European Chokepoints 44
- ABSTRACT 44
- Threat prevention 55
- The ability to deny 55
- The ability to act 56
- Curtailment 57
- Quantum Sensing Applications in Healthcare 59
- ABSTRACT 59
- Quantum tech in Europe 60
- Chinas policies on and ambitions and strate- gic goals for quantum technology 62
- Chinas overall position in quantum sensing 62
- Performance 63
- Weaknesses and path dependencies 64
- Europes ambition policies and strategic goals for quantum sensing technology 66
- Quantum sensing technology framework and deployment in Europe 67
- Europes strategic goals for quantum sensing technology in healthcare 68
- Europes indispensability to China in quantum sensing for healthcare 69
- Level 1 threat prevention 71
- Level 2 ability to deny 71
- Level 3 ability to act 72
- Level 4 curtailment 73
- Level 1 Threat prevention 73
- Level 2 Ability to deny 74
- Level 3 Ability to act 74
- ABSTRACT 76
- Dependencies in Blockchain and Smart Contracts Technologies Markets and Policy 76
- Ability to deny 85
- Ability to act 86
- ABSTRACT 88
- Critical Raw Materials What Chinese Dependencies what European Strengths 88
- AI for Medical Imaging MRI Scanners and the Roles of Philips and Siemens in China 102
- ABSTRACT 102
- Magnets 109
- Support services 110
- ABSTRACT 112
- Automotive Chips a European Chokepoint 112
- ABSTRACT 126
- Space Exploration 2040 Regaining European Technological Leadership 126
- Threat prevention 134
- Ability to deny 135
- Ability to Act 135
- Curtailment 136
- The Role of European Providers in Chinas Facial Recognition Apparatus 139
- ABSTRACT 139
- What China needs to deploy facial recognition technologies 141
- Apart from ASML China currently no longer needs Europe to achieve its ambitions 143
- Chinese weaknesses and potential European strengths in the coming 10 to 15 years 146
- Semiconductors fabrication of CIS and AI chips for use in facial recognition systems 147
- Quantum annealing 148
- Semiconductors 148
- Quantum annealing 150
- Threat prevention 151
- Ability to deny 151
- Ability to act 151
- Curtailment 151
- Threat prevention 152
- Ability to deny 152
- Ability to act 153
- ABSTRACT 155
- Regaining and Maintaining the Advantage in Biotechnologies by Protecting Against Genomic Data Flows to China 155
- Threat Prevention 163
- Ability to deny 164
- ABSTRACT 166
- European Tech Standardisation Power Durable Indispensability of Another Kind 166
- Case Study I 5G energy saving technology 169
- Case Study II Automotive chips 172
- Case Study III Facial Recognition 175
- Threat prevention 177
- Ability to deny 178
- Ability to act 178
- Digital and Green Transitions Opportunities and Challenges for Europe and China 184
- ABSTRACT 184
- Digital and green technologies conceptualisa- tion and identifi cation 187
- Country analysis 190
- Analysis by technologies 190
- Technological specialisation 192
- Analysis by patent value 194
- Summary of fi ndings 196
- Europes Strategic Technology Autonomy from China Assessing Foundational and Emerging Technologies 208
- Chinas Digital Power Assessing the Implications for the EU 208
- Notes 209
- Notes 210
- Imprint 211
