Amid growing interest in industrial policy, we develop a model exploring the tension between market-driven information discovery and policymakers' career incentives. While market-based information discovery can help address informational barriers faced by policymakers, career incentives may lead them to aggressively pursue their agendas to signal political capability, shifting dynamics toward a government-centric equilibrium. In this equilibrium, market participants focus on policy-related information over industry fundamentals, weakening the market’s role in information discovery and reducing policy efficiency. Our analysis highlights the importance of bureaucratic frictions and market-based information discovery in jointly shaping the effectiveness of industrial policy implementation.
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- Acknowledgements & Disclosure
- I don't have any relevant funding or financial relationships to disclose. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.3386/w33107
- Pages
- 44
- Published in
- United States of America
Table of Contents
- NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES 1
- INFORMATION DISCOVERY FOR INDUSTRIAL POLICY 1
- Michael Sockin Wei Xiong 1
- Working Paper 33107 httpwww.nber.orgpapersw33107 1
- NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge MA 02138 November 2024 1
- Information Discovery for Industrial Policy Michael Sockin and Wei Xiong NBER Working Paper No. 33107 November 2024 JEL No. D84 L59 P0 2
- Michael Sockin Department of Finance UT Austin McCombs School of Business Austin TX 78712 michael.sockinmccombs.utexas.edu 2
- Wei Xiong Princeton University Department of Economics Bendheim Center for Finance Princeton NJ 08450 and NBER wxiongprinceton.edu 2
- 1 The Model 5
- 1.1 Firms 7
- 1.2 Capital Suppliers 9
- 1.3 Government 9
- 1.4 Equilibrium Definition 9
- 2 Market Equilibrium 10
- 3 The Political Economy Equilibrium 13
- 3.1 Career Incentives 14
- 3.2 Career-Driven Policy Choice 15
- 3.3 Welfare-Maximizing Choice 16
- 3.4 Constrained Policy Choice 17
- 4 Conclusion 18
- References 19
- Appendix A Proof of Propositions 21
- Online Appendix for Information Discovery for Industrial Policy 26
- Online Appendix B An Investment Game 41
- Online Appendix C Additional Expressions 42