The primary context of the overall reforms advanced by the Hungarian government is the perilous financial crisis of the Hungarian judicial system, which pushed the judiciary to the brink of collapse. [...] € 1,400)6 jeopardizing the functioning of courts and the independence of the whole justice system.7 All judicial representatives, the NJC, the Kúria President and the NOJ President unanimously agreed that a 35% salary raise is inevitable.8 4 The provisions of Chapter XII and Annexes 2 and 3 of the Bjt., especially Section 169(2) of the Bjt. [...] [...] The idea of a salary raise contained in the agreement is significantly different from the salary raise requested by the NJC and the NOJ, so supporting the agreement is a significant step backwards.”15 MABIE also requested the MoJ to “involve the Hungarian Association of Judges in the drafting of legislation affecting the organisation of the judiciary and the legal status and remuneration of. [...] As the judges point out, the document is not the result of the fair negotiations of equal parties: the “discussion was unilateral”, and only the government’s will prevailed.23 In the face of the unprecedented protest of Hungarian judges, on 2 December 2024, the NOJ President publicly admitted that the ‘Agreement’ lacks any binding force.24 On 3 December 2024, the NJC convened an extraordinary meet. [...] The consequence of all this is my resignation, and I acknowledge my responsibility for it.”26 The strong protest of Hungarian judges not only paved the way towards restoring the independence of the NJC but also discredited the illusionary legitimacy of the ‘Agreement’ depriving the Hungarian government of the possibility to refer to the deal as ground for advancing the planned reforms.
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