The US Pretrial System: Balancing Individual Rights and Public Interests

20.500.12592/q5vp3x

The US Pretrial System: Balancing Individual Rights and Public Interests

1 Oct 2021

In this article, we review a growing empirical literature on the effectiveness and fairness of the US pretrial system and discuss its policy implications. Despite the importance of this stage of the criminal legal process, researchers have only recently begun to explore how the pretrial system balances individual rights and public interests. We describe the empirical challenges that have prevented progress in this area and how recent work has made use of new data sources and quasi-experimental approaches to credibly estimate both the individual harms (such as loss of employment or government assistance) and public benefits (such as preventing non-appearance at court and new crimes) of cash bail and pretrial detention. These new data and approaches show that the current pretrial system imposes substantial short- and long-term economic harms on detained defendants in terms of lost earnings and government assistance, while providing little in the way of decreased criminal activity for the public interest. Non-appearances at court do significantly decrease for detained defendants, but the magnitudes cannot justify the economic harms to individuals observed in the data. A second set of studies shows that these costs of cash bail and pretrial detention are disproportionately borne by Black and Hispanic individuals, giving rise to large and unfair racial differences in cash bail and detention that cannot be explained by underlying differences in pretrial misconduct risk. We then turn to policy implications and describe areas of future work that would enable a deeper understanding of what drives these undesirable outcomes.
other public economics law and economics labor economics labor studies demography and aging

Authors

Will S. Dobbie, Crystal Yang

Acknowledgements & Disclosure
This paper is forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Perspectives. We thank David Arnold, Peter Hull, Erik Hurst, Nina Pavcnik, Timothy Taylor, and Heidi Williams for helpful comments and Dan Ma and Nada Shalash for research assistance. All opinions and errors are our own. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3386/w29332
Published in
United States of America