Introduction: Issues for the Second Independent Accident Investigation: Do not brook the “normal pattern”

In the Independent Accident Investigation, the predecessor of this project, we examined many phenomena based on the initial message from our Chairman Koichi Kitazawa to “understanding the background of this unfortunate accident and thereby learn the lessons to make our country safer.” In Part One, the history of the accident was organized chronologically and the cause of the accident was analyzed. [...] Apart from the nuclear accident, we also explained the environmental impact of the spread of radioactive material, the problem of internal exposure through food, and the risks posed by low-dose exposure as well as assessing the extent of the impact of the Fukushima Daiichi accident and sharing a basic understanding of what was required for coping in the aftermath of the accident. [...] Additionally, the Independent Accident Investigation focuses on the response to nuclear disasters in the field, and what role first responders, the Self-Defense Forces, the police, and the fire department play, highlighting problems stemming from the absence of a premise of mutual cooperation, including a lack of mutual communication and problems of command and the command system. [...] As a result of coordination with the government bill, the establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority and the Nuclear Regulatory Agency as a secretariat of the authority was approved by the Diet. [...] The relationship between the two is summarized in “defense in depth as a system”, which will be touched on in the section on independence below, so we will only briefly mention it here, but the “primary responsibility for safety” of the operator is the responsibility of the operator to ensure the safety of nuclear power, to enhance it, to keep the risks of nuclear power as low as possible and cont.