Strategies Behind China and the Asia-Pacific’s Military Base Construction

Military bases are no rarity in the Asia-Pacific.  That is hardly a surprise given the frequency and length of conflicts that were waged across the region for much of the twentieth century.  But, in the decade-and-a-half after the Cold War, the Asia-Pacific experienced a remarkable period of interstate peace and stability.  Military bases were consolidated, scaled down, or shuttered entirely.  Most notably, the United States vacated what once were its two largest overseas bases in the Philippines and incrementally reduced its footprint in South Korea.  While Washington claimed that it would make up for its smaller forward presence with new, long-range “global strike” assets, the closures appeared to signal an American pullback from the region. However, since the late 2000s, military bases seemed to have come back into fashion with China, Japan, the countries of Southeast Asia, and even the United States.  Indeed, military bases are important manifestations of national strategy.  Politically, they demonstrate a level of national commitment and deter potential adversaries in a way that fleeting force deployments cannot.  Militarily, they extend capabilities by serving as platforms from which countries can monitor dangers and exert power.  Such factors, not to mention the financial resources needed to build and maintain bases, hint at the true intentions and priorities of national strategies.  As such, the pace of new military base construction in the Asia-Pacific has been noteworthy and points to a new era of sustained interstate tensions. First-Mover Advantages The first country to build a new military base in the Asia-Pacific after the Cold War was China.  It did so at Yalong Bay on Hainan Island at the northern edge of the South China Sea during the late 2000s.  The ostensible reason for building the base was to better assert China’s sovereignty claims over the waters.  At the time, the Chinese military’s reach in the region was too short to do so effectively.  China’s nearest naval base at Sanya was too small to house a large fleet and the ranges of its tactical aircraft on Hainan were not long enough to support regular patrols, let alone combat operations, over the area.  The new Yulin naval base at Yalong Bay tackled both issues: it could accommodate not only more warships, but also bigger and more complex vessels, like aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submarines. By the late 2010s, China had gone further; it constructed several small artificial islands and military bases on the features that it controls within the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos.  The bases were outfitted with docks, gun emplacements, radars, and an assortment of intelligence-collection gear.  On Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef, China also built airfields large enough for H-6 bombers and facilities for HQ-9 surface-to-air missile and YJ-12 anti-ship missile batteries.  China’s new bases in and around the South China Sea have enabled Beijing to better maintain persistent surveillance and assert its sovereignty claims over the region. But some of the facilities that China has built on its South China Sea bases also seemed to indicate a grander strategic aim.  The elaborate submarine tunnel complex at Yulin naval base is perhaps the prime example.  Dug under a mountain at the tip of Yalong Bay, the tunnel complex was designed to support several nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines.  Such warships are hardly necessary to assert Chinese sovereignty claims (or give Beijing an edge over its Southeast Asian neighbors, for that matter).  Rather, the tunnel complex suggests a strategy to establish a naval bastion in the South China Sea for the sea-based leg of China’s nuclear triad.  Seen in that light, the missile batteries that Beijing installed on its military outposts in the Spratly and Paracel Islands make more sense, not only to assert Chinese sovereignty claims, but also to screen the bastion’s southern approaches. Meanwhile, China’s expansion of its air and naval bases along the East China Sea appears to have had multiple objectives too.  Starting in the late 2000s, China expanded its naval base at Xiangshan with an underground submarine tunnel and those at Dinghai and Zhoushan with several piers and repair facilities.  It also upgraded nearby naval air bases with hardened hangars and, in the case of Danyang naval air base, runway improvements for H-6 bombers.  Similar improvements followed at Chinese air force bases, like those at Longtian and Huian.[1]  In 2012, China completed a brand-new air base near Xiapu and expanded it a few years later.[2]  It now serves as a forward-deployment base for Chinese J-11 and Su-30 fighters and may become a permanent base in the future. A principal reason for such construction at Chinese military bases along the East China Sea is no doubt related to China’s preparations for a Taiwan contingency.  But they also enable China to pursue other strategic aims, including asserting its sovereignty claims over the Senkaku Islands and securing the Miyako Strait.  Indeed, warships from China’s East China Sea naval bases now rely on the strait as their main conduit into the Pacific Ocean.  In addition, Chinese fighters, like those deployed at Xiapu air base, have come to regularly practice escorting H-6 bombers armed with YJ-83 anti-ship missiles through the strait.[3]  Likely, China’s expansion of its air and naval bases along the East China Sea has as much to do with Chinese power-projection ambitions as it does with an envelopment of Taiwan. Reluctant Base Builders At the turn of the new millennium