Systems Thinking in Irregular Conflicts Case Study - Al Qaeda and Islamic State Tribal Management

While Al Qaeda’s application of indiscriminate violence may have partially contributed to the tribal rejection of the Sunni tribe – Al Qaeda alliance; the main driver was the growing concern that Al Qaeda was co-opting or gaining greater influence and power over their Sunni allies.[6] The Islamic State Tribal Management The Iraq war against the Islamic State (IS) originated in the broader post-200. [...] Know that today you are the defenders of the religion and the guards of the land of Islam”.[9] The Islamic State controls vast stretches of territory across Iraq and Syria; such an area of control would be impossible without the at least tacit support of select Sunni tribes who may feel marginalised from Baghdad or failed to respond to the power emergence of IS. [...] The tribal alliance structure cannot be detached from the Sunni irregular groups in the area of operations, as it is invariably the tribes that provide the majority of the resources and local support. [...] Upon the Islamic State’s takeover of Fallujah in mid-2014, the FMC had to in-effect cede control in the face of the superior military force of the Islamic State. [...] [7] For a deeper understanding of broader sectarian issues and the role of Iran: Geneive Abdo, The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi’A-Sunni Divide, (Washington DC: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, April 2013).