The Next Front? Sino-Russian expansionism in the Arctic and a UK response

The 2021 Integrated Review described the UK as ‘the nearest neighbour to the Arctic’,30 and the Defence Command Paper described investing to project UK forces for ‘NATO’s flanks’ including ‘the High North and Arctic’, explaining how the ‘High North and maintaining security in the defence of the North Atlantic remains of great importance, underlining the value of our strong relationship with Icelan. [...] The most important intergovernmental forum for the Arctic is the Arctic Council.79 The Council was launched in the Ottawa Declaration of 1996, including the ‘A8’ countries as well as representatives of the region’s indigenous communities. [...] The Council was also central to the International Maritime Organisation’s binding International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (2015).88 Given the precluding of military discussions by the Council, the ‘Arctic 8’ have devised alternative fora to discuss military affairs, in particular the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (founded in 2011) and the meetings of the Arctic Chiefs of Defence. [...] The Standing Committee itself meets three to four times a year.94 In its own words, the Committee also works ‘actively to promote the work of the Council and participates in the meetings of the Arctic Council as an observer’.95 The Standing Committee hosted the 14th Conference in Oslo in 2021 (with representatives from Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, the US, Canada, Russia, and one from. [...] The first is the approach evident in documents such as the Science of Military Strategy, which emphasises the strategic nature of the Arctic and the measures China should take to maximise its advantage in future confrontations: ‘new geopolitical struggles for control over… the polar regions… will tend to become intense’.122 The second is the less confrontational and more “diplomatic” approach whic.