The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the Institute of Defence

20.500.12592/9135z6

The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the Institute of Defence

6 Sep 2022

The idea was reiterated in June this year at the High-level Dialogue on Global Development (hereafter, the Dialogue) held on the sidelines of the 14th instalment of the summit involving the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, or the BRICS countries. [...] Like the BRI, which is defined in the 2021 white paper China’s International Development Cooperation in the New Era as China’s public good for global development, the GDI was introduced to project a benign international image and show that China intends to contribute to global governance for world development. [...] Beijing’s unveiling of the GDI furthermore declares in the face of rising global uncertainty and intensifying tensions with the West, that China must “take the initiative to seek change, and successfully capture and create opportunities during crises and difficulties”. [...] Then, to take concrete action under the GDI framework, Xi later said at the Dialogue that China would upgrade the SSCAF to a Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund (GDSSCF), and add $1 billion to the fund on top of the $3 billion already committed under the SSCAF. [...] But, considered to be the Chinese proxy endorsement for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the GSI reflects the fact that China does not share the Western concept of security.
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