To Coerce, or Not To Coerce? Assessing Policy Strategies To Regulate Small-Scale And Artisanal Minin

8 Figure 1: Complete Sequential Model The utility of the informal miners is a function of the size of the informal mining territory (m), the power of organization (c), the potential tax rate they will pay under state regulations (T) and the probability of success if the informal miners fight the state (p). [...] The utility functions of the state are a function of the size of the mining territory (m), the potential tax rate (T), the probability that the informal miners who fight are successful (p) and the cost of coercing the informal miners (r). [...] Finally, the state must decide whether to co-operate with the informal miners, knowing that they will comply (but that the state will lose a considerable amount of control over the law) or to coerce the informal miners and risk the miners successfully resisting regulation. [...] Editorials disapproved of the relationship between the state and the miners and encouraged the executive to change strategy. [...] At that stage, the miners began highlighting the mistake in the law — lack of offices and personnel to comply with the requirements, high costs, lack of differentiation among actors in the supply chain and the lack of distinction between type of deposits (Fowks 2014).