Success and failures of international institutions in the post-Yugoslav crisis

SC with Resolution 820.30 The divisions among the Twelve, and the resultant lack of a common policy, determined the slow pace of EC diplomacy and the ineffectiveness of the measures taken to stop the war. [...] Divisions emerged about the following: - the issue of recognition of the republics of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia and Croatia, first and Macedonia later); - the imposition of economic sanctions with diverging views about the nature and the range of measures to be adopted and the mode and the time of their application; - the measures to be taken to tighten the trade embargo, Greece being charge. [...] The diplomatic wording was a clear signal that the EC was willing to forgo the plan, basically accepting the reality of the situation on the ground, following the military operations and ethnic cleansing.34 The dicotomy emerged more clearly when the EC (at the same Copenhagen meeting) agreed to accept the UN request for more troops, a commitment restated at the G-7 summit in Tokio.35 Actually, by. [...] Though the United Nations had assumed the conduct of the diplomatic and military game on the Yugoslav chessboard more than the EC, the military role of the EC countries, which were providing the bulk of the U. [...] Italy, then president of the WEU, assumed the responsibility of the coordination with the Danubian countries.47 It was another occasion for the WEU to demonstrate its capacity for playing a role, after the participation of WEU naval units in the embargo operations in the Adriatic and the explicit offer of 15,000 soldiers to participate directly in the peace enforcement operations in Sarajevo.