A Deeper Look Into the West African Coup Wave

20.500.12592/n194jz

A Deeper Look Into the West African Coup Wave

9 Jan 2023

Bottom Line
  • Coup d’états have taken place over the last three years in the West African states of Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso. Military governments are still in place in each country.
  • The roots of this wave lie in regional instability, poor governance by elected leaders, and many successful past coups.
  • Other West African states offer evidence that future coups are not inevitable and democratic progress is possible.
West Africa has recently been rocked by military uprisings. In the past three years, rogue soldiers have overthrown the presidents of Mali (August 2020 and May 2021), Guinea (September 2021), and Burkina Faso (January and September 2022). The confluence of constitutional crises in the region raises several questions. Why these three countries? Why now, in such short succession? And finally, what does the future hold for their populations, each still under military rule? Figure 1: Coups in West Africa Source: OpenStreetMap Although these events do represent a trend, with similar causes and timing, the broader picture does not necessarily suggest that the coup wave will spread elsewhere in West Africa. The causes of each coup are particular to each country’s past and present, and similar states have been able to transition into much more durable democracies. Forceful Rhetoric Forcibly imposed military rule has a long and widespread history in Africa. Since the independence of most African states during the 1960s, the number of coups across the continent’s fifty-four countries has ranged every decade between eight and twenty-six, by one count. In each case, military strongmen are fully aware of the illegality of their actions and take pains to construct a façade of legitimacy as soon as possible. A day after arresting President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in August 2020, Mali’s Committee for the Salvation of the People publicly accused Keita’s government of corruption and announced its decision to “take our responsibilities before the people and before history” by ousting him. In September 2021, Col. Mamady Doumbouya followed a similar script, explaining his overthrow of Guinean President Alpha Condé by declaring on national television that “the duty of a soldier is to save the country.” Next to fall was Burkina Faso’s President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. Just four months after the Guinean coup, Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Damiba claimed that the severity of ongoing Islamist insurgency in the country had “imposed” the arrival of his Patriotic Movement for Protection and Restoration, pledging to step down once the security situation was under control. The juntas in Mali and Guinea have also promised to make way for civilian governments, but proposed elections still remain years away. Divisions within the Malian and Burkinabé interim authorities have even resulted in two further coups, exacerbating instability. A Perfect Storm of Coup Causes Political conditions in Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso are closely related to each country’s turbulent past and present. Over the last five years, terrorists are estimated to have gained control of up to 40 percent of Burkina Faso’s territory, leading to 2,500 closed schools and over one million internally displaced persons. Mali’s share of the regional conflict is less severe at the moment, but is nonetheless longer and more complex, dating back to early 2012. The two countries are now said to be the primary source of violence in their region, locked into a dangerous self-perpetuating instability. Across the sparsely populated, poorly policed Sahel, weak local governance creates gaps for jihadist movements to fill, which further weakens local governance—and lends legitimacy to coup plotters. Security crises are “fertile ground” for coups, according to Malian sociologist Aly Tounkara, as does the “lack of integrity of leaders.” The same accusations of corruption made by Mali’s junta against Keita had also been levelled by Mali’s voters. During his time in office, criticism of Keita culminated in massive protests demanding his resignation over his handling of the Islamist insurgency and a series of corruption scandals, most notably including disputed legislative elections. Disregarding ongoing negotiations by the Economic Community of West African States, Keita’s generals took matters into their own hands, dissolving parliament and forcing him to resign. Toppled presidents in Guinea and Burkina Faso both provoked fierce criticism for their own illiberal measures. In arresting opposition figures, outlawing protests, and restricting media freedom, Condé displayed increasingly authoritarian tendencies that made him a subject of international criticism. September 2021 may have been a breaking point, coming on the heels of a 2020 referendum Condé arranged to reset constitutional term limits.

Authors

Daniel Baltoi

Published in
United States of America