Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 22, 2023 Kateryna Stepanenko and Frederick W. Kagan

This report focuses on the Kremlin’s recent marginalization of the Wagner Group following the culmination of the drive on Bakhmut and it’s the Kremlin’s return to reliance on conventional forces on the frontlines and the regular Ministry of Defense (MoD) and General Staff apparatus. [...] Russian President Vladimir Putin had likely turned to Prigozhin and Prigozhin’s reported ally, Army General Sergey Surovikin, to continue efforts to gain ground and break the will of Ukraine and its Western backers to continue the war after the conventional Russian military had culminated and, indeed, suffered disastrous setbacks.1 The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and General Staff, headed by. [...] Putin began to re-centralize control of the war effort under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in early December.2 He gave Gerasimov overall command of the Joint Grouping of Forces in Ukraine on January 11, subordinating Surovikin to Gerasimov along with two other deputies.3 The Russian MoD announced large-scale reforms to expand and reconstitute the Russian Armed Forces on January 17.4 Ukrain. [...] 1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2023 Putin’s decision to focus and rely on conventional Russian forces is marginalizing the Wagner Group and the siloviki faction that nevertheless continues to contribute to Russian war efforts in Ukraine. [...] 5 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2023 6 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2023 7 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2023 8 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2023 9 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2023 1 .