Leadership from Iran: How Al-Qaeda in Yemen Fell Under the Sway of Saif al-Adel

Al-Qaeda’s leadership during this period tried to ride the wave of popular protests against the Saleh regime and capitalize on the rise of Islamists to prominence across the region to achieve two objectives: to create political alliances with new government forces in Yemen – led by the Islamist Islah Party – to make the state less hostile to jihadist activity; and to use the collapse of state inst. [...] When the Houthi movement seized control of Sana’a in 2014, Al-Zawahiri left the decision on whether to cooperate with the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis to the Yemeni leadership, as well as the decision to establish an AQAP presence in major cities like Aden, Mukalla, and Taiz during security vacuum created early in the conflict.[13] Al-Wuhayshi was able to rise quickly within the ranks o. [...] Expecting the Islamic State to announce responsibility, members of the Yemeni branch were surprised to find Al-Raymi claiming the attack as an AQAP operation in a recorded video statement released just days after his death on January 29.[34] The announcement not only angered the members of the group in Yemen; it was a shock too to the central leadership in Afghanistan, who objected to the lack of. [...] If AQAP goes down the path of attacks against Western, Saudi, and UAE interests in Yemen, it will significantly complicate the current balance of power and present a real threat to UN de- escalation efforts and the fragile stability that has held despite the lapse of the 2022 truce in October, especially in areas under the control of the internationally recognized government. [...] The clear involvement of Al-Qaeda in the fighting against Houthi forces in 2015 and 2016 helped feed the international community’s fear of the jihadist group benefiting from the war, prompting the US and its allies to exercise significant pressure on Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the government to avoid military escalation.