Can that really be right? Is the answer that you 8 within the TMO, and over it by RBKC; a failure by the 8 are to give to the survivors , to the grieving families 9 LFB to learn the lessons of Lakanal, and other fires , 9 and to the wider public to be that the Grenfell Tower 10 and to train its operational staff to collect , 10 fire was just a terrible accident, just one of those 11 understand and. [...] 16 literature for RS5000 concealed the existence of the 17 The fire , the last moments of those who were trapped and 17 layer of magnesium oxide on the test rig in describing 18 doomed in and by that building, and the deaths that 18 the test components, as it did, but then to blame the 19 ensued, were anything but. [...] 15 On the night of the fire , so far as the exit of the 15 Of course, the UK Government decided to retain class 0, 16 fire into the cladding is concerned, from flat 16, that 16 despite the fact that some products achieving it would 17 was not caused by the ACM, but by: first, the use of 17 not achieve class B, as the UK Government knew. [...] 16 of the main contractor role to Rydon, and particularly 17 Now, you have no expert, of course, to say that 17 the absence thereafter of a design responsibility matrix 18 Rydon fell below the standards set in the contract with 18 and who was responsible for what, such that everyone 19 the TMO, and that is a point you will need to consider 19 thought that the compliance of the façade with the 20 w. [...] 11 First , the ACM PE panels for the fire, the 11 So far as the AOV and the lifts are concerned, the 12 concealment of the true results of the testing of the 12 TMO expected that they were properly maintained, and 13 Reynobond PE 55 and the BBA certificate.
- Pages
- 29
- Published in
- United Kingdom