After the removal of the Hafnium web shells in 2021,14 the United States announced the takedown of the Hive Network in January 202315 and the removal of the Snake malware in Operation MEDUSA16 in May 2023. [...] Choose your active cyber defenders The prior study argued that there must be a central focal point at the strategic level overseeing all active cyber defense operations and responsible for adjusting the overall active cyber defense policy.79 This focal point should oversee legal structure and authorities — including the operational and non-operational norms mentioned here — independent from the op. [...] The UK government states that “[a] core part of responsible cyber operations is the design and use of capabilities in a way that is predictable and controllable, and where the risks are proportionate to the outcome required.”84 This applies to all kinds of tools and services used in active cyber defense operations, especially if they are intrusive. [...] Lindsay (2013): Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare and Kim Zetter (2015): Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World‘s First Digital Weapon 83 JD Work (2021): Balancing on the rail – considering responsibility and restraint in the July 2021 Iran railways inci- dent 84 National Cyber Force (2023): The National Cyber Force: Responsible Cyber Power in Practice 23 . [...] However, the effect of the active cyber defense operation may also take place on the IT systems of the initial victims — see, for example, the Emotet takedown.116 While — for several reasons outlined earlier — technical reconnais- sance and intelligence prior to the operation will hopefully have revealed the na- ture of the threat, it is not relevant in terms of responsible state behavior based on.
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