Strategic stability on the Korean Peninsula: dual crisis and risk reduction measures

The opinions articulated in the report represent the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network or the European Leadership Network, or any of their members. [...] A key component of South Korea’s strategy is the ‘Three-Axis’ system; this includes a kill chain for pre-emptive strikes against the origin of an attack, the ‘Korea Air and Missile Defence’ system for intercepting incoming missiles at the terminal phase, and the ‘Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation’ system aimed at neutralising the adversary’s C2 by targeting its leadership in the event of an. [...] Amid geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific, the United States has emphasised its strategic flexibility to address security threats beyond the Korean Peninsula, especially in the Taiwan Strait.27 In a crisis, South Korea is likely to work with the United States to determine the level and form of support needed. [...] In such a scenario, the cost of conflict for North Korea would increase as the US would not withdraw the forces needed for South Korea’s defence, and the ROK military would concentrate on defending the Korean Peninsula. [...] Restructuring the current separate format—nuclear talks between the US and North Korea and conventional weapons talks between North and South Korea—can address a broader set of challenges, including the stability-instability paradox, the blending of conventional and nuclear deterrence, and coordination issues between the US and South Korea.