cover image: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

27 Feb 2024

The formal transfer of regions previously under the responsibility of the Northern Fleet is likely part of a wider Russian effort to re-establish military district commands as the primary headquarters for the Russian ground forces while reassigning naval assets to the Russian Navy, as ISW previously reported.[5] Russian state media reported in November 2023 that naval assets of all five of Russia’. [...] This information is still unconfirmed, but it appears that the Russian military is trying to reconsolidate ground forces and assets under military districts while consolidating naval forces and assets under the Russian naval chain of command.[6] The re-creation of the MMD and LMD supports the parallel objectives of consolidating control over Russian operations in Ukraine in the short-to-medium ter. [...] • The formal transfer of regions previously under the responsibility of the Northern Fleet is likely part of a wider Russian effort to re-establish military district commands as the primary headquarters for the Russian ground forces while reassigning naval assets to the Russian Navy, as ISW previously reported. [...] • The re-creation of the MMD and LMD supports the parallel objectives of consolidating control over Russian operations in Ukraine in the short-to-medium term and preparing for a potential future large-scale conventional war against NATO in the long term. [...] Russian officials and propagandists used the Second Congress of the International Russophile Movement and the Forum on Multipolarity on February 26 to amplify several long-standing Russian information operations.[69] Russian Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs Grigory Karasin claimed that the event demonstrates the world’s interest in joining a coalition with R.

Authors

Kendrick Frankel

Pages
19
Published in
United States of America