“We didn’t know the first days what would happen, and we were a little scared of how the system would react … The solution was to play the role of non-violent people: that we just want to discuss, that we are peaceful on the streets and squares … Afterwards it became famous as a new kind of revolution, but I believe that a big reason for this was that the system was still very strong and could sti. [...] Crossing the border, going west – the first real experience of this was very deep.” www.esiweb.org/cafe-europe Café Europe 3 But this was not the end of the transition. [...] Because the majority, the very big majority of the population was in favour of Mr. [...] Meciar’s fall, says Simecka, was the outcome of the combined efforts of four groups of actors: NGOs; opposition politicians, who managed to overcome their difficulties and rivalries and forged a broad electoral alliance; artists, intellectuals, and the media; and foreign diplomats who began saying openly that something had to change for Slovakia to catch up with the EU enlargement train. [...] And we pushed the government to talk about this inequality.” In the end, the 1998 changes that saw Meciar replaced by a pro-EU coalition turned out to be a crucial turning-point.
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- Bosnia and Herzegovina
