OSW Commentary - On the threshold of a third year of war. Ukraine’s mobilisation crisis

the front line continuously since the beginning of the war and who make up the backbone of the army. [...] Considering the present stabilisation of the front, the opportunities for a quick replenishment of the units with a large number of volunteers have become exhausted because the most recent inflow of volunteers occurred last year, as part of the enlistment campaign ahead of the summer offensive.10 Also, a size- able group of citizens is reluctant to support the mobilisation, as they are aware of th. [...] In addition, it is evident that the president’s power base intends to shift the responsibility for the failure of the offensive, the excessive losses and the need to conscript several hundred thousand individuals (as the war is expected to continue for another year) onto the military, in particular the former Commander-in-Chief General Zaluzhnyi. [...] However, in the long term Kyiv’s procrastination in expanding the scope of mobilisation may have a very negative impact on the progress of the war, especially in the context of a possible further wave of mobilisation in Russia this spring, which could translate into a boost for the Russian army in the second half of 2024. [...] The manner in which one of the most important laws for the shape of the armed forces in the third year of war and for the state’s ability to continue to effectively defend itself has been prepared and processed, combined with the delaying tactics applied by the decision makers responsible for the political supervision of the armed forces, indicate that a profound crisis of strategic management is.