Following a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, the district court denied the woman’s posttrial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial and entered judgments for the pharmacy and the pharmacist on each of the woman’s claims: business discrimination against the pharmacy and pharmacist; public-accommodations discrimination against the pharmacy; and aiding and abetting violations. [...] He also told her that he “was not willing to participate in the dispensing of the prescription” due to “[his] beliefs.” Badeaux informed Anderson that another pharmacist was scheduled to work on January 22 who was willing to dispense the prescription, but the other pharmacist might not make it in to work because of the forecasted storm. [...] When considering whether the evidence justifies the verdict, we consider “whether the verdict is so contrary to the preponderance of the evidence as to imply that the jury failed to consider all the evidence, or acted under some mistake.” Clifford v. [...] Because we conclude that the evidence establishes that Badeaux “intentionally refuse[d] to do business with” Anderson within the meaning of section 363A.17(3), we now turn to the crux of the parties’ dispute: whether Badeaux’s refusal to dispense ella to Anderson is sex discrimination under the MHRA. [...] Because the record shows that Aitkin Pharmacy was willing and able to dispense ella to Anderson, we conclude that there is a reasonable theory of the evidence to support the verdict that Aitkin Pharmacy did not intentionally refuse to do business with Anderson within the meaning of section 363A.17(3).
- Pages
- 45
- Published in
- United States of America
