MILITARY Institutions

The inclusion of the last three roles on the CMC reflects Xi’s efforts to transform the PLA into a US-style “joint” force with integrated command of the different services, to ensure the military’s absolute loyalty to the CCP (and to Xi’s leadership), and to stamp out the rampant corruption that undermined China’s military readiness in the past. [...] The CMC oversees the PLA’s five service branches: the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF); the PLA Navy (PLAN); the PLA Air Force (PLAAF); the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), which controls China’s conventional and nuclear missiles; and the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), which handles operations in the space, cyber, electronic, political, and psychological domains. [...] The same reforms created the PLARF out of the old Second Artillery Corps and established the PLASSF to focus military efforts on fighting the next generation of “information warfare” in the cyber, intelligence, and space domains. [...] The NDMC General Office, however, is in the CMCDMD, showing that the bureaucratic muscle of the commission is firmly within the military rather than the government apparatus. [...] Zhong Shaojun (October 1968) is the Director of the CMC General Office, the Director of the CMC Chairman’s Office (CMCCO) that handles Xi’s day-to-day military business, and the apparent Director of the Office of the CMC Leading Small Group for National Defense and Military Reform.