EFSAS STUDY PAPER - China's Belt-and-Road Initiative in Europe - Assessing Germany and Italy's Responses and

The first section of this paper introduces the role of the BRI in Europe, examining investment volumes and destinations as well as the EU’s collective response to the initiative. [...] In the evolving landscape of global infrastructure development, the interplay between China's BRI and the EU's GGI underscores the shifting dynamics and competition in international relations and trade. [...] The MoU was widely “perceived as a way to secure more exports to China and more chances to access financing from the AIIB”, especially in infrastructure, and enhanced the access of Chinese firms to the port in Trieste while including the possibility of managing the ports in Genoa, Palermo, and Ravenna (Dasgupta, 2019). [...] Meloni, who entered office in 2022, described the decision to join the BRI as a “big mistake” and suggested that “Italy is the only G7 member that signed up to the accession memorandum to the Silk Road, but it is not the European or Western country with the strongest economic relations and trade flows with China” (Sacks, 2023). [...] For Italy, in contrast, joining the BRI raised the prospects of additional financing, aimed to avoid being left behind in the connectivity environment of the Mediterranean Sea, and responded to the challenging relationship with Brussels at the time.