Report - About the Small Arms Survey - PERSISTENT PERILS - Illicit MANPADS in the MENA Region

The Survey identified reports of illicit possession of advanced MANPADS in nine MENA states—more than in any other region of the world (see Table 2).19 The data also indicates that the illicit acquisition of advanced MANPADS is not an iso- lated event in most of the affected countries. [...] The same is true of most of the advanced MANPADS in the possession of armed groups in the MENA region since 2015, including the FN-6s circulating in Syria and in neighbouring states and the QW-pattern systems acquired by armed groups in Gaza, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.25 The key difference between state-sponsored MANPADS smuggling in previous dec- ades and recent transfers to armed groups is that t. [...] The tweet erroneously identifies the system as a ‘Stinger’ and points to Türkiye as the source.34 A patch on the uniform of one of the individuals is similar to patches worn by the Libyan GNA but, because the faces of the individuals are redacted and the photos were taken in a nondescript building, UN investigators and other analysts were unable to confirm that the photos were indeed taken in Liby. [...] Like the FN-6 MANPADS supplied to Syrian rebels, the most likely source of the illic- it QW-pattern MANPADS circulating in the MENA region is a foreign government, and the government most likely to supply MANPADS to Hamas, Hezbollah and Kata’ib Hezbollah, the Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades, and the Houthis is Iran. [...] 16 The HT-16 differs from the Igla-1 in at least two ways: firstly, the connector for the battery coolant unit (BCU) is located closer to the opening of the launch tube and thus the BCU sits closer to the opening of the launch tube; and secondly, instead of the Igla-1’s tri-cone tip, the HT-16 missile has an aerodynamic spike similar to the Igla’s.