The characteristics of the GSI are best understood in the context of China’s domestic approach to crime prevention, in which the party-state is vested with vast powers and the law is best seen as a tool utilized by the political elite. [...] A large group of emerging economies and developing countries have risen together, causing the world’s economic focus to move to the Asia-Pacific region and resulting in the East rising while the West declines.23 Wu picks up on the matter in Xi’s speech, noting ‘a focus on the reshaping of the world order and improvements to global governance mechanisms’.24 In this context, Wang’s framing of the GS. [...] China is willing to take the implementation of the GSI as an opportunity to work with Middle East countries and the international community to jointly promote the construction of a new security architecture in the Middle East.45 In terms of organizations, one finds the GSI approach (and the concept of a Community of Common Destiny for Mankind within which it is embedded) present throughout the Chi. [...] Further details provided in the notes.92 Building on the findings and their implications in South East Asia, investigation into the backgrounds of the people and organizations connected to the GTSEZ shows how the nexus between crime and geopolitics extends beyond the immediate region. [...] The interview reveals that Chen is the secretary-general of the financial group of non-party intellectuals of the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (中央统战部党外知识分子建言献策专家组财金组秘书长).96 It is likely that this refers to the UFWD’s fifth bureau, which is dedicated to ensuring that intellectuals not formally affiliated with the CCP remain amenable to the pa.
- Pages
- 35
- Published in
- Switzerland
