There is a persistent question over how to communicate U.S.-ROK alliance deterrence posture, particularly in the event of a nuclear attack by North Korea.
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- United States of America
Table of Contents
- Nuclear for Nuclear? Understanding Divergent South Korean and American Perceptions on Deterring North Korea 1
- Does ambiguity about how the alliance will respond to a nuclear attack strengthen or detract from deterrence of North Korean nuclear first use? 2
- Is Kim Jong Un more deterred from first use of nuclear weapons by the expectation of a nuclear response than a nonnuclear response? 4
- Does the United States’ desire for ambiguity in its declaratory policy imply a lack of resolve, either to use nuclear weapons if necessary or to defend South Korea? 5
- ADDITIONAL LINKS 7
- PROGRAM 7
- Nuclear Policy 7
- AUTHORS 7
- More work from Carnegie 8
