As war rages in Ukraine, the logical step for the United States has been to revitalize its security cooperation with NATO. This is the project that President Joe Biden’s administration has skillfully orchestrated since February 2022.
But waiting in the wings of the Euro-Atlantic alliance—and requiring renewed clarity and focus—is America’s pacing threat of China.
This is the belief which many in Washington harbor—notably among certain quarters of the current GOP foreign policy establishment and even, to a lesser extent, a growing number of Democratic elites—that China, not Russia, is the greater challenge to Western interests, and consequently, that Asia, not Europe, should be America’s primary focus.
Theirs is a cogent assessment, one backed by significant assertions of Chinese power and mounting evidence of Beijing’s aggressive intent. Exhibit A should be new British intelligence claiming that “lethal aid is now, or will be, flowing from China to Russia and into Ukraine,” and US confirmation that China is already providing weapons components to Russia.
This community of so-called Asia “prioritizers” is here to stay. Though sometimes described pejoratively as Asia First-ers, they carry broad bipartisan appeal in Washington. Biden’s own National Defense Strategy, released eight months after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, distinguishes between Moscow as presenting “serious, continuing risks in key areas,” and Beijing’s actions—from gunboat diplomacy in the South China Sea, to debt-trap diplomacy across Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa—as representing perhaps “[t]he most comprehensive and serious challenge to US national security.” Furthermore, the Biden administration is staffed by an essential figure in the Asia prioritizers camp: Kurt Campbell, a key architect of former President Barack Obama’s pivot to Asia who most recently served as the Indo-Pacific coordinator on the Biden National Security Council. Campbell’s elevation to the role of US Deputy Secretary of State earlier this February affirms the gravity of Washington’s shifting focus from the Middle East and Europe to the Indo-Pacific.
Whoever occupies the White House in January 2025, the Asia First outlook will continue to permeate US priorities in Europe and most certainly determine the future of Ukraine. Elbridge Colby, another prominent Asia prioritizer, who oversaw development of former President Donald Trump’s 2018 National Defense Strategy and whose name has been floated as a possible candidate for a crucial role in a future Republican administration, has been typecast as a critic of unconditional US support for Ukraine. Colby’s recent comments urging an imminent shift to deterring China around Taiwan should not be construed to signal any rationalization of a sudden decision to abandon Ukraine, but to spur a serious dialogue with European allies about building a more robust and self-sufficient Euro-Atlantic alliance essential for long-term stability against Russian aggression. Therefore, in the spirit of jumpstarting the kind of frank discussion that Colby’s remarks may be intended to elicit, Atlanticists from Brussels to London should set aside their fears of the Asia prioritizers to seek constructive, practical terms with them, regardless of who wins the next US election in November.
First, Atlanticists must recognize that Asia prioritizers are not weak isolationists, and should not be dismissed as such, an argument recently articulated by my colleague Mohammed Soliman. Rather, Asia prioritizers believe that the Indo-Pacific matters most for long-term US interests and thus, that the US Congress should not let Ukraine aid get in the way of enhanced support for Taiwan, that lawmakers should spare no expense for floundering efforts like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, and that senior officials should not let events in Europe dictate preparations for the long-term strategic relationship-building and partner capability integration needed in Washington’s priority theater.
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