The Role of Russian Private Military Contractors in Africa

The Role of Russian Private Military Contractors in Africa

21 Aug 2020

It is no secret that Moscow is increasingly utilizing so-called “private military contractors” (PMCs) to pursue foreign policy objectives across the globe, especially in the Middle East and Africa. What has received less attention is that Moscow’s deployment of PMCs follows a pattern: The Kremlin is exploiting a loophole in international law by securing agreements that allow contractors to provide local assistance. The problem is, however, Russian PMCs are not simply contractors. This pattern of Russian behavior presents a new challenge that Western policymakers should address, as it speaks to broader Russian influence in Africa in the context of great power competition. This challenge is about Moscow’s erosion of broader behavioral norms. A similar scenario has played out in Libya, Sudan, Central African Republic (CAR), and Madagascar. First, these governments hold official senior discussions with Moscow and agree on simplified post-visits. The country then provides Russia with port or airfield access. Next, the two agree that Moscow will provide some form of local assistance, creating a legitimate reason for “private contractors” to come to a county, for example, to help with natural resource extraction or provide security. This is the loophole—technically there is nothing prohibiting Moscow from making these arrangements. The next logical step is a Russian navy or air force visit, which further solidifies the official Russian presence. This pattern emerged around 2016. By then, in Libya, Moscow had already built relations with the United Nations-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli and Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army in Tobruk. Moscow leaned more heavily on Haftar, who came to Moscow in July 2016 and met with senior Russian officials, including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Haftar then offered Moscow a resumption of Gaddafi-era deals and suggested he could provide key port access in the east. In mid-2017 and early 2018, as ISIS took credit for several attacks in Libya, Russian special forces and “security contractors” began helping Haftar. As Reuters reported in March 2017, the contractors claimed they had a commercial arrangement to clear mines from an area that Haftar had liberated from ISIS. Russian PMCs continued to clear mines and guard port oil installations amidst doubts about the true nature of their activities. By late 2019, Libya emerged as an open proxy battleground, where Moscow increasingly asserted control not only through major deployments of PMCs and the provision of advanced weaponry, but also by providing training to Haftar’s fighters. In this context, Moscow began to openly discuss plans for a naval base in Libya. A similar pattern unfolded in Sudan and CAR. In October 2017, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held talks with CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadera. CAR reportedly needed help in fighting more than a dozen militias, including the predominantly Muslim Séléka rebels and the majority Christian Anti-balaka forces, that have been locked in a war against the central government—and each other—since 2013. According to Reuters , France offered CAR guns, but Moscow “objected and donated its own weapons instead.” By February 2018, Moscow sent planes to CAR, while Russian “contractors” appeared on the ground to protect mining projects and provide security training. The next month, Putin met with then-Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir who reached out to Putin for support against “aggressive U.S. actions,” and Moscow agreed to provide equipment and other assistance to Sudanese forces. Russian Su-35 fighter jets, meanwhile, had arrived in Sudan. After the meeting, Russian mining company M Invest (now sanctioned) received preferential access to Sudanese gold mines. Russian official statistics also showed an increase in Russian citizens travelling to Sudan by the end of the year. By at least July 2018, Russian PMCs appeared in training camps in Sudan, while CAR and Russia signed a military cooperation agreement that allowed Russia to train CAR’s military and send “advisors” the next month. In early to mid-2019, Moscow and Khartoum unveiled a number of economic, security, and military cooperation agreements, from oil and gold mining to the training and equipping of the Sudanese military. According to multiple reports, Russian PMCs increasingly became involved in the country, where the Wagner Group—owned by Yevgeniy Prigozhin, who has close ties to Putin—not only had secured survey and mining rights, but also helped to delegitimize opposition to Bashir and train the Sudanese military. The same PMCs appeared to have trained Sudanese and CAR troops. Bashir fell from power in April 2019, but Moscow retains ties to Sudan and appears to still be interested in securing a base in the country.

Authors

Anna Borshchevskaya

Published in
United States of America