China’s Military Modernisation: Recent Trends

Since the assumption of Xi Jinping to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2013, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone numerous changes, both in its modernisation and organisation, that are meant to ensure that the PLA forces will be battle-ready. The modernisation aims for the PLA to acquire the latest technology and logistics for quick and decisive victories in any theatre of battle. This brief examines these institutional changes in China’s military, which have also resulted in the PLA firmly coming under the control of the CPC, ensuring that the loyalty of the PLA is always kept under check. The brief updates an earlier version published by ORF in 2019. [1] Attribution: Kartik Bommakanti and Anant Singh Mann, “China’s Military Modernisation: Recent Trends,” ORF Issue Brief No. 381 , July 2020, Observer Research Foundation. Introduction China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone dramatic changes since the first push for modernisation in the 1980s and 1990s. The modernisation involved constant updates of doctrine, while ensuring that the equipment and organisational structure were improved to better reflect the changing demands of warfare. Doctrinally, the PLA has moved away from the ideal espoused by the republic’s founding father, Mao Zedong, of a major conflict with the Soviet Union to one where the military would be more heavily involved in localised conflicts. [2] As the former Chinese Defence Minister Zhang Aiping observed in 1983: “The principle of war is to achieve the greatest victory at the smallest cost. To achieve this we should depend not only on political factors, but also on the correct strategy and tactics of the war’s commander, the sophisticated nature of our military equipment, the quality of our personnel who use the equipment etcetera.” [3] Indeed, the implementation of this strategy is being seen in the current stand-off between Indian and Chinese forces in Ladakh and Sikkim along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).Table 1: PLA Personnel, 1980-2020 (in million) Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 PLA Army 3.6 3.16 2.3 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.035 [a] PLA Navy 0.63 0.35 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.255 0.255 0.235 PLA Air Force 0.4 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.42 0.4 0.33 0.398 Strat Forces/Coast Guard 0 0 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Reserves 0 5 4 1.2 0.55 0.8 0.51 0.51 0.51 Paramilitary 7 4.3 12 1.2 1.1 1.5 0.66 0.66 0.66 Total number of PLA Personnel 11.63 13.3 16.32 5.42 4.49 4.665 3.455 3.503 3.205 Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance , 1985-2015 in Cordesman, A.H., Colley, S., “Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2015: A Comparative Analysis” in Centre for Strategic and International Studies , Washington, D.C., 2015, p. 167. [4] ; IISS The Military Balance , 2020, vol. 120, (1), 2020, p. 530. [5] Learning the lessons from their war against Vietnam in early 1979, the PLA took serious steps in its reorganisation. [6] Recognising the decreasing likelihood of a total war, [7] the Central Military Commission (CMC) under Deng Xiaoping instituted major changes between 1985 and 1995 in doctrine, organisation and equipment, while keeping in mind local yet intensive wars. [8] Some of these changes included greater emphasis on joint operations, production of indigenous equipment, and converting the overall PLA into a leaner and more efficient fighting force, reducing its total personnel from 13.3 million in 1985 to 5.4 million in 1995 (See Table 1).