In the US context, it is a reasonably common the US EAR — a comparatively flexible regime com- practice for companies to deliberately seek to have pared to that of the ITAR — and the cohabitation of their dual-use capabilities captured by the EAR military and dual-use items under the same regula- administered by the Department of Commerce, tory suite.125 In March 2024, the Technology Council rathe. [...] In the United States, — since September 2021.176 the scope of proposed reforms and the demands made of Australia and the United Kingdom betray When it comes to Pillar II, the AUKUS partners have a lingering ‘superpower mindset’ when it comes rationalised the contents of the ETL against the 3 to assessing the capacity of allies to both generate countries’ commitments to 4 major international and to. [...] For instance, review periods to streamline the Committee Report accompanying the Senate Armed Services Committee’s FY25 NDAA proposal future reforms includes a direction for the incumbent administra- tion to submit “an assessment of the effectiveness Relatedly, Australia, the United Kingdom and the of the modifications to the International Traffic United States should also better align the review. [...] In that respect, the US Government could also pro- pose regulations to specifically mitigate the taint in The United States and seemingly Australia will also cases where the flow of technology and knowledge need to rigorously address the negative industrial in any given capability predominantly originates in incentives inherent in the concept of the ‘taint.’ Australia or the United Kingdom — in ot. [...] Addressing office and defence industry these issues will require the hiring of a new cadre of experienced export control professionals in the security program Australian Government with “deep expertise in the technological and legal aspects of the defence in anticipation of industry and the adjacent dual-use space,”240 as spiking requirements well as incentives to maximise the retention of experie.
- Pages
- 60
- Published in
- Australia
Table of Contents
- AUKUS enablers Assessing defence trade control reforms in Australia and the United States 1
- Table of contents 3
- Foreword 2 3
- Executive summary 3 3
- Recommendations 4 3
- Introduction 6 3
- Where AUKUS currently stands 8 3
- Restating the export control problem 9 3
- The export control reform debate May 2023 to present 11 3
- Whats in a word Exploring comparability 14 3
- From reform to harmonisation Defence trade control reform proposals in Australia and the United States 3
- Key observations for AUKUS Specific issues for consideration 25 3
- Conclusions and recommendations 36 3
- Endnotes 45 3
- About the authors 57 3
- Foreword 4
- Executive summary 5
- Unilateral requirements 6
- Recommendations 6
- To address these challenges and prepare for further harmonisation work Australia and the United States will need to consider actions at the unilateral and trilateral level. 6
- Trilateral requirements 7
- Introduction 8
- The potential 8
- The objective of fostering a seamless trilateral defence innovation base working hand in glove on new cutting-edge technologies will not be fully realized by present reforms alone. 8
- The barriers to success 9
- The way forward 9
- Where AUKUS currently stands 10
- Restating the export control problem 11
- The export control reform debate May 2023 to present 13
- Whats in a word Exploring comparability 16
- Proposals in the United States the EAR and the ITAR 18
- From reform to harmonisation Defence trade control reform proposals in Australia and the United States 18
- Proposals in Australia Amendments to the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012 21
- Did Australia emulate the ITAR 22
- The net effect of current export control proposals Integration over innovation 26
- 1. Heightened political risks of failure 27
- Key observations for AUKUS Specific issues for consideration 27
- Legal comparability alone would not insulate Australia against the risk of suspension in the event of a high-profile breach of defence export controls. 28
- 2. The authorised user enrolment process Gatekeeping the trusted community 29
- 3. The Excluded Technologies List An impediment to AUKUS Pillar II 30
- 4. Nonproliferation and the Missile Technology Control Regime 32
- 5. A superpower mindset for AUKUS innovation 32
- 6. Co-production and exportability 34
- 7. License free not ITAR free compliance requirements and literacy 35
- 8. Downstream requirements Future candidates for harmonisation 36
- 1. Comparability certification Locking in the Canadian exemption for Australia and the United Kingdom 38
- Conclusions and recommendations 38
- 2. Align defence trade control review periods to streamline future reforms 39
- 3. Addressing the taint Moving beyond the Canadian ITAR exemption 40
- To reflect the spirit of AUKUS the three countries should seek to establish a genuinely trilateral mechanism for verifying authorised users of the AUKUS defence trade licensing exemption. 42
- 4. Staff-up the Australian defence export control office and defence industry security program in anticipation of spiking requirements 42
- 5. Procedural parity Establish a genuinely trilateral authorised user mechanism 42
- 6. Increase resourcing for Australian government programs designed to assist SMEs with managing new compliance costs 43
- 7. Establish an AUKUS industrial security mechanism to identify and progress further regulatory harmonisation efforts on a trilateral basis 43
- 8. Establish a presumption of sharing for discrete MTCR categories related to AUKUS Pillar II 44
- Endnotes 47
- About the authors 59
- Dr William C. Greenwalt 59
- Tom Corben 59
