The choice to reenter the agreement should be evaluated in light of its direct impact on Iran’s nuclear program and, just as importantly, on the administration’s objective of creating the conditions for the United States to pivot away from the Middle East. [...] Combined with the Biden administration’s retreat on “snapback” sanctions, and with it the undisputed lapse of the UN conventional arms embargo on Iran pursuant to the JCPOA, the nuclear deal likely will enable further advances in Tehran’s precision strike capabilities and its ability to stand up Shia militias around the region. [...] The attempt to reenter into the JCPOA should, therefore, be evaluated not only in light of its direct impact on Iran’s nuclear program but also, and just as importantly, on the administration’s goal of creating the conditions for the United States to turn its focus and resources away from the Middle East. [...] As JINSA spelled out in a March 2021 report, just the initial step of getting back into the JCPOA is easier said than done, even if the Biden and Rouhani administrations agree publicly on the need to do so.28 Beyond the technical hurdles to both sides rejoining the deal, each insists the other must be the first to resume compliance. [...] Thus in April a State Department official appeared to be conforming to Tehran’s demand for sanctions relief above and beyond the deal when he said “all sanctions that are inconsistent with the JCPOA and are inconsistent with the benefits that Iran expects from the JCPOA, we are prepared to lift”(italics added), despite the latter having nothing to do with the terms of the deal itself.82 At the sam.
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